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ABSTRACT: Governments and their international agencies (FAO, World 
Bank) conceive of the eradication of hunger and poverty as a worthy wish 
that will eventually be realized through economic growth. They also make 
great cosmetic efforts to present as good-looking trend pictures as they can. 
Citizens ought to insist that the eradication of severe deprivations is a human-
rights correlative duty that permits no avoidable delay. Academics ought to 
collaborate toward providing a systematic alternative monitoring of what 
progress has really been made against undernourishment and other poverty-
related deprivations. 
KEY WORDS: Food and Agriculture Organization, Human Rights, 
Monitoring, Millennium Development Goals, Poverty, Progress. 
 
With the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their recently anointed successors: the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), much more public attention has come to be paid to matters of 
poverty and development. It is widely understood now that humanity has been in possession, for some 
time, of the economic, technological and administrative means for the complete eradication of severe 
poverty on our planet. And the insistence that we must accomplish this task with all deliberate speed is 
no longer the domain of leftist fringe groups and dedicated NGOs, but reaffirmed at the preeminent 
summits at which the leaders of our governments take care of the world’s business. When the SDGs 
were adopted at the September 2015 meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York, the central 
commitment all governments joined hands in proclaiming was that we will “end poverty in all its forms 
everywhere” by 2030. With both the capacity and the political will clearly in evidence, we can rest 
assured that our governments will once and for all eradicate severe, life-threatening poverty from this 
planet within the next few years. 
But, given the great importance of the issue, let us not rest assured too easily. Let us look at how well 
the world has actually done with regard to the MDGs that governments had adopted in the year 2000. 
The MDGs set 18 targets for the year 2015, so we can look and see how close we have come to 
reaching them.  
The most prominent of these targets, listed under the first MDG, envisioned that we would, between 
1990 and 2015, halve extreme poverty and undernourishment. Tracking the former target, the World 
Bank reports that the prevalence of extreme poverty in the developing world has declined by two-thirds, 
and this already three years before the deadline;1 so in this regard we have achieved vastly more than 
promised. Tracking the latter target, the FAO reports that, during the MDG period, the prevalence of 
undernourishment in the developing world has declined from 23.3% in 1990-92 to an estimated 12.9% 
in 2014-16 (FAO, IFAD & WFP 2015, 8). This is a 45% decline rather than the promised halving, but 
the shortfall seems too small to be alarming, too small to disturb our confidence that our governments 
are really hard at work toward implementing their ambitious plan to end poverty in all its forms 
everywhere. 
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But, given the great importance of the issue, let us conclude this essay with a brief examination of how 
the FAO tracks progress against undernourishment. This task is made easier by the fact that the FAO 
has in 2012 introduced a new method for identifying and counting the world’s undernourished people 
and has provided a detailed explanation of this method (FAO, WFP & IFAD 2012, 50-56). 
 
1. The FAO Definition of Undernourishment 
Any method for tracking the extent of undernourishment consists of two components: a definition of 
undernourishment; and then measurement and estimation procedures for arriving at a count of the 
people suffering undernourishment so defined.  
The FAO’s operative definition is clear and straightforward:  
“undernourishment” has been defined as an extreme form of food insecurity, 
arising when food energy availability is inadequate to cover even minimum 
needs for a sedentary lifestyle. … the FAO indicator is designed to capture a 
clearly – and narrowly – defined concept of undernourishment, namely a state 
of energy deprivation lasting over a year” (FAO, WFP & IFAD 2012, 50).  
The FAO definition of undernourishment thus has four elements. A person is to count as 
undernourished at some particular time just in case this time is part of a period of more than one year 
during which the food energy that is available to her – also referred to by the FAO as her dietary energy 
intake (FAO, WFP & IFAD 2012, 50) – is insufficient to cover even minimum needs for a sedentary 
lifestyle. Let us look more closely at these four elements of the FAO’s operative definition. 
The first element is that the FAO is focusing solely on dietary energy. This exclusive focus is 
problematic because human beings do not live on energy alone. If they did, then feeding people 
sufficient amounts of sugar could cheaply and elegantly solve the entire global undernourishment 
problem. Not even Coca Cola would claim that this is a solution. It is indisputable that human beings 
need various proteins, vitamins, minerals and other micronutrients to be adequately nourished, nay even 
to survive. Deficiencies in such nutrients are extremely widespread among poor people in less 
developed countries. Three poverty-related such deficiencies, in particular, each cause hundreds of 
thousands of deaths annually. Vitamin-A deficiency substantially increases the annual death toll from 
measles, diarrhea, and malaria and also causes much vision impairment and blindness. Iron deficiency 
results in widespread anemia, which causes maternal and perinatal deaths and deaths in young children. 
Zinc deficiency contributes substantially to deaths from diarrhea, pneumonia, and malaria in children 
under five. Also important is iodine deficiency, which impedes intellectual development and physical 
growth.2 By ignoring such specific nutrient deficiencies in its definition, the FAO is failing to recognize 
as undernourished all those hundreds of millions of people who take in sufficient energy (calories) but 
do not get some of the specific nutrients essential to healthy survival.  
The second element is that the FAO is focusing solely on dietary intake. This exclusive focus is 
problematic because not all the nutrients a person ingests are actually absorbed by her or his body. 
Many people in impoverished regions are infected with parasites that can easily consume as much as 
one-third of the nutrition they ingest. And others there suffer from diseases that impede the absorption 
of nutrients through the small intestine. By ignoring these common problems through its exclusive 
focus on intake, the FAO is further enlarging its undercount of the world’s undernourished: the FAO is 
failing to recognize all those whose nutrient intake is adequate even while their nutrient absorption is 
not. 
The third element of the FAO’s operative definition of undernourishment is that, to count as 
undernourished, a person’s energy intake must be “inadequate to cover even minimum needs for a 
sedentary lifestyle.” This author and, I suspect, many of his readers are amateur experts on a sedentary 
lifestyle. I spend most of my days seated at my desk reading or typing away on my keyboard. But many 
poor people in the less developed countries do not, and cannot, indulge in such a lifestyle. The 1800 
daily kilocalories that suffice to keep me going will not suffice to sustain a rickshaw driver whose 
income depends on transporting heavy loads on battered roads, often uphill. These 1800 kilocalories 
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 3 
will also not sustain a homemaker who must carry large jugs of water from a distant well, do the 
laundry in the river, collect firewood, grind cereals, participate in harvesting, and so on.  
We can get a sense of what difference this makes from what we know about our own calorie 
consumption when we go to the gym. Exercise machines that have a display of calories burned usually 
tell me that I burn about 10 kilocalories per minute or about 600 kilocalories in a 60-minute workout. 
Laborers working merely half as hard as I do in the gym, and this for merely 6 hours per day, thus burn 
an extra 1800 kilocalories per day over and above the sedentary minimum. Living on an 1800-
kilocalorie diet deemed adequate by the FAO, such workers would starve and quickly become unable to 
hold down the job that pays for their food. But, by the FAO definition, such workers are classified as 
adequately nourished even while they consume only half the calories they need. By defining 
undernourishment in terms of the minimum requirements of a sedentary lifestyle, the FAO is then 
failing to recognize as undernourished all those millions who get enough food for a sedentary lifestyle 
but not enough for the work they actually do, and must do, to sustain themselves and their families.  
The fourth element of the FAO’s operative definition of undernourishment is that, to be deemed 
relevant, a nutritional deficit must last for “over a year.” The FAO’s count will therefore exclude people 
who are suffering seasonal hunger during wintertime and even people whose food supply is inadequate 
for eleven consecutive months. The FAO has an official justification for this decision, which is 
remarkable enough to deserve quoting in full: 
the reference period should be long enough for the consequences of low food 
intake to be detrimental to health. Although there is no doubt that temporary 
food shortage may be stressful, the FAO indicator is based on a full year 
(FAO, WFP & IFAD 2012, 50).  
Noteworthy here is the magnanimous concession that going hungry for less than a year may, just may, 
be stressful. But this concession is quickly superseded by the clear and resolute assurance that such 
under-one-year periods of hunger are certainly not detrimental to health. 
This assurance is evidently radically incorrect. We know from the historical record of famines and 
hunger strikes that, with sufficient clean drinking water, human beings can survive without food for 
about 45-60 days at a low activity level. Even when they can get a little food here and there, people in 
famines often succumb in well under a year. In fact, many historical famines have lasted well under a 
year and have still killed tens of thousands of people. So, contrary to the FAO’s assurance, periods of 
“temporary” hunger can be extremely “detrimental to health.” Moreover, there are literally hundreds of 
studies documenting the health effects of even brief periods of undernourishment especially on 
children. Such temporary food shortage often permanently impedes mental and physical development, 
causing lifelong deficits in height, health and mental functioning (including stunting and wasting). It 
has even been documented – by tracking the children of women who were born just before the Great-
Leap-Forward famine in China or the 1960 earthquake in Chile – that periods of severe 
undernourishment during childhood often damage the health of one’s offspring born decades later.3  
By recognizing only undernourishment lasting for over a year, the FAO is failing to recognize all those 
millions of people whose health is ruined by extended but shorter periods of inadequate nutrition. The 
FAO definition even excludes many of the 7 million human beings who die annually from inadequate 
nutrition, including some 3 million children. Many of these victims die after suddenly losing their 
access to adequate food as a result of some dramatic change in their circumstances, due to famine, for 
example, or due to the outbreak of war or civil war or due to an emergency affecting their household or 
community, such as a failed harvest, loss of employment, disease or accident.4 Those who die within a 
year never qualify as undernourished by the FAO’s definition – even though they died from inadequate 
nutrition and nothing else. 
As a final critical point about the FAO definition, let us ask whether there can be an undernourished 
rickshaw driver. We might be inclined to answer in the affirmative. But, according to the FAO, such a 
person is a biological impossibility. Given the third element of the FAO definition, this rickshaw driver 
would have to live on less than the minimum caloric requirements of a sedentary lifestyle; but, were he 
actually to do so, he would be dead in well under a year, thereby failing to satisfy the fourth element. 
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Having examined the FAO definition of undernourishment, we need not examine the FAO procedures 
for estimating the number of people suffering undernourishment so defined. The reason is that, even if 
the FAO procedures got the count precisely right, they would miss most actual undernourishment as 
any competent speaker of English would conceive of it. Guided by the FAO definition, these 
procedures ignore, by design, nutritional deficits other then energy. They ignore nutritional deficits due 
to impaired food absorption. They ignore nutritional deficits by people whose workload exceeds that of 
a sedentary lifestyle. And they ignore shorter-than-one-year nutritional deficits that cause death or ill 
health. Nutritional deficits of each of these four kinds are very widespread, and their inclusion could 
easily double or even treble the reported prevalence of undernourishment. 
It could be said in defense of the FAO method that the FAO simply lacks the resources to drill down to 
the individual level: to study how the dietary intake of particular individuals relates to their dietary 
needs. All the FAO can do, given its resource constraints, is to make rough estimates about the total 
amounts of food consumed in the various countries and the distribution of this consumption over each 
country’s residents.  
I have three responses to this defense. First, if this is the situation, then the FAO should clearly say so 
rather than pretend that it can measure the number of undernourished people with four-digit precision. 
The FAO should clearly state that it is able to provide a rough estimate of the number of people who 
ingest fewer calories than needed for a sedentary lifestyle. It should provide confidence intervals for 
this estimate. And it should state clearly that its estimate excludes nutritional deficits other than energy, 
nutritional deficits due to impaired food absorption, nutritional deficits by people whose workload 
exceeds that of a sedentary lifestyle and shorter-than-one-year nutritional deficits that cause death or ill 
health. Above all, the FAO should clearly declare that, so far, no one has provided the resources that 
would be necessary to make reasonably accurate estimates of the extent, trend and geographical and 
demographic distribution of undernourishment in this world. 
Second, the FAO should cite what credible relevant estimates are available even if it cannot integrate 
them into a single overall count. It should cite studies like, for example, that by the World Health 
Organization, which provides detailed data about the prevalence of iron-deficiency anemia, which 
especially afflicts women during their reproductive years (ca. 259 million) and young children aged 6 to 
59 months (ca. 134 million).5 This way the public can at least get a rough sense of what is being left out 
of the FAO count. 
Finally, the FAO should seek funding for one or two thorough checks on its method to permit a rough 
appraisal of the magnitude of its error. These checks should be conducted by an independent research 
institute and involve taking a random sample in a randomly selected country or province, 2000 people 
perhaps, and then interviewing and examining these people for various kinds and symptoms of 
undernourishment. The resulting detailed snapshot could then be compared with whatever gross 
estimate the FAO has come up with for the same country or province, based on aggregate food 
consumption and distribution data. Such an independent check would give us at least a rough sense of 
the FAO’s likely underestimation of undernourishment worldwide.    
 
2. The Political Background of the FAO’s New Method 
In the preceding section, I hope to have shown not merely that the way the FAO tracks 
undernourishment is flawed, but that it is deeply flawed in obvious ways. The experts involved in 
formulating the FAO’s new method know vastly more about human nutrition than I do, and it would be 
wholly incredible to claim that this is the best definition their collective expertise and wisdom could 
produce. So why did the FAO commit itself to such a plainly absurd method? 
To understand this, we need to understand that progress against undernourishment has great political 
significance. A major argument for the grand neo-liberal globalization project is that it produces 
equitable economic growth: growth that lifts all boats, growth that lifts billions of human beings out of 
poverty. Making and winning this argument became especially important in the wake of the large-scale 
protests that overshadowed the launch of a new millennial round of trade negotiations at the WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Seattle in late November 1999. Before Seattle, the World Bank had painted a 
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 5 
rather disturbing picture of the evolution of extreme poverty in the world: “The ongoing increase in 
population levels means that the absolute number of those living on $1 per day or less continues to 
increase. The worldwide total rose from 1.2 billion in 1987 to 1.5 billion today and, if recent trends 
persist, will reach 1.9 billion by 2015” (World Bank 2000, 25). After Seattle, the picture brightened 
overnight, with World Bank President James Wolfensohn writing: “After increasing steadily over the 
past two centuries, since 1980 the total number of people living in poverty worldwide has fallen by an 
estimated 200 million — even as the world’s population grew by 1.6 billion.”6 Today, the World Bank 
reports that in the 1987-99 period the number of people living in extreme poverty fell by 113 million7 
and that, throughout the 1990-2015 period, the decline in extreme poverty has been vastly faster than 
envisioned in the first MDG.8 
Annoyingly, the FAO did not get the message and reported steadily rising numbers of undernourished 
people throughout the first decade of the 21st century. During this time, those few who paid attention 
were thus treated to the rather odd spectacle of the World Bank reporting rapid declines in the number 
of people living in extreme poverty even while the FAO reported increases in the number of people 
going hungry. By the end of the decade, the World Bank’s cumulative poverty decline since 1996 had 
grown to 600 million people while the FAO’s cumulative undernourishment increase since 1996 had 
grown to 200 million people. Understanding the close relationship between extreme poverty and 
undernourishment, it is evident that these reported data series cannot both be right. It also became 
increasingly obvious that one of these two UN agencies would eventually have to back down. 
Things came to a head when the FAO announced on 19 June 2009 that the number of undernourished 
people had, for the first time in human history, broken above 1 billion.9 The reason for this increase was 
a massive surge in world food prices – the FAO’s inflation-adjusted World Food Price Index had spiked 
from 112.7 in 2006 to 155.7 in 2008.10 Such massive increases in the prices of basic foodstuffs always 
inflict the greatest pain upon the poor because they tend to spend 80-90% of their incomes on food and 
typically have the least opportunities to mobilize additional funds or to switch to cheaper foodstuffs. It 
is not surprising, then, that the massive price hikes triggered severe food shortages and food riots in 
dozens of less developed countries, including Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen.11  
Shortly after the FAO made its widely publicized 1-billion announcement – which foreshadowed its 
subsequent “1 Billion Hungry” campaign, launched under the “We Are Mad As Hell” slogan12 – the 
world’s governments decided to reform the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) and convened, in 
October 2009, a High Level Panel of Experts for Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE).13 Led by a 
steering committee of “15 world-renowned experts” from 15 different countries,14 this panel solicited 
and discussed a CFS expert report on the FAO’s previous method and its possible improvement.15 The 
CFS then issued its own rather unspecific recommendations on the monitoring of undernourishment,16 
which provided the needed cover for revising the FAO’s method for estimating undernourishment still 
before 2015, the crucial year in which the expiration of the MDGs would occasion an overall 
assessment of the neo-liberal globalization project and the associated development efforts.  
To be sure, no such cover would ordinarily be needed for an intergovernmental agency’s decision to 
replace a method. In this case, however, cover was needed for two reasons. First, it is highly unusual, 
and plainly bad practice, to introduce a new measurement method, with plenty of hindsight, just barely 
before the end of a measurement period (in the 22nd year of the 25-year MDG exercise) – especially in a 
hotly political case, where the impact of globalization on the world’s poor was heavily contested. 
Second, the switch to the new method led not to minor changes but to a dramatic reversal in the 
reported trend data, as the nearby table shows: it converted an 8% increase in the number of 
undernourished people into a 13% decrease and thereby brought the FAO’s reporting into closer 
alignment with the World Bank’s. It ensured, at least, that the officially reported undernourishment and 
extreme-poverty trends were now firmly headed in the same direction. 
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 Millions of Undernourished in the Developing Regions Reported by FAO 
Year Before 201217  in 201218 in 201519 
1990–92 833 980 990.7 
1995-97 774 909  
2000–02 821 905 908.4 
2005–07 839 870 926.9 
2009 1007 853  
2010 910 852 805.0 
2014-16   779.9 
 
Remarkable about the new data is also that they show no impact of the massive surge in food prices 
during 2006-08. While the old numbers showed this surge causing a severe crisis among the world’s 
poor, the new numbers show a steady decline in undernourishment during the relevant period, food riots 
in dozens of countries notwithstanding. The new hunger numbers persuasively vindicate the grand neo-
liberal globalization project, which some had begun to question on the basis of the old hunger numbers: 
Washington-style globalization truly lifts all boats and, in particular, continuously lifts millions of poor 
people above the undernourishment and extreme-poverty thresholds.20 
 
3. The Political History of the Hunger Goal 
The idea that the world can and should eradicate hunger within a generation has been around since at 
least the middle of the 19th century and has been variously reiterated in the U.S. by Woodrow Wilson, 
Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Robert McNamara and others. The current version of this idea, 
which envisions that we undertake a first step of halving hunger by 2015, first came to social 
prominence at the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome. Some 186 governments signed on to this goal in 
their Summit Declaration with the words: “We pledge our political will and our common and national 
commitment to achieving food security for all and to an on-going effort to eradicate hunger in all 
countries, with an immediate view to reducing the number of undernourished people to half their 
present level no later than 2015.”21 
Reading this pledge, one might stumble over the strange use of the word “immediate.” There is nothing 
immediate about a plan that allows 19 years for getting merely half of the work accomplished. To be 
sure, eradicating hunger is no picnic. But the same is true, even more so, of defeating the axis powers in 
the Second World War. So think of Franklin D. Roosevelt giving a speech in mid-1941, reciting the 
horrendous atrocities the Nazis and their allies were inflicting upon German citizens and the rest of 
Europe, and then pledging himself to an effort to end these horrors “with an immediate view” to 
achieving a 50% reduction by 1960. If Roosevelt had actually made such a pledge with a straight face, 
many would have thought he had gone mad, become morally deranged. And yet, when the world’s 
governments made such a pledge regarding the fight against hunger, it was received with celebration 
and hearty congratulations all around. 
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 7 
One might want to justify this asymmetry of response by pointing out that the suffering caused by 
poverty and hunger isn’t as bad as the suffering caused by Nazi Germany and its allies. But, in fact, 
poverty and undernourishment cause some 18 million painful deaths each year, some 450 million 
during the MDG period,22 while the entire Second World War caused “only” around 60 million 
deaths.23 So ending poverty and undernourishment isn’t clearly less urgent or less important than 
ending the predations of the axis powers. 
As another justification for the asymmetry, one might want to argue that overcoming poverty and 
hunger is much harder and more expensive than defeating the axis. But this, too, is untrue. At the height 
of the Second World War, the belligerent powers spent about half of their Gross National Incomes on 
fighting the war – the Russians, the British and even the U.S. did so. Overcoming poverty and hunger, 
by contrast, would require only around 2% of the rich countries’ Gross National Incomes and could be 
done relatively quickly. This latter fight would also be much easier because it would not really be a 
fight. Nobody would be opposing us; no one would stand up to defend hunger and poverty.  
So the grand promise of 1996 was really remarkably unaspiring. With so many millions of lives at 
stake, the assembled governments should have committed themselves to a much more ambitious effort. 
This assessment is greatly supported by the fact that they were, during the 1990s, reaping substantial 
economic rewards from the end of the Cold War, which enabled the high-income countries to reduce 
their military spending by about 2% of gross national income (ca. $400 billion per annum). How much 
of this peace dividend did the high-income countries devote to promoting poverty eradication and 
economic development in the poorer countries? Did they, with their Peace Dividend, at least finally 
fulfill their old pledge from the 1970s to increase their official development assistance to 0.7% of their 
gross national incomes? Sadly, no. The high-income countries sharply reduced their official 
development assistance during the 1990s from 0.32% down to 0.22% of their gross national incomes – 
presumably on the calculation that, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the less developed countries 
had no choice but to accept Western leadership. 
Back to the World Food Summit pledge of 1996. This pledge committed the world’s governments to 
reducing, no later than 2015, the number of undernourished people to half the present (1996) level. At 
the time this pledge was made, the 1996 number of undernourished was not yet available, but the FAO 
subsequently put it at or close to 790 million.24 The pledge thus was that in 2015 there would be no 
more than 395 million undernourished human beings. The governments making this pledge may have 
assumed that ordinary economic growth would produce the 3.6% annual decline needed to reach the 
target and that they would therefore not actually have to make any special efforts toward reducing 
undernourishment. If so, they were sorely mistaken. The year 1996 turned out to be an all-time low in 
the number of undernourished people,25 and at the dawn of the new millennium the FAO found itself 
compelled to announce: “This year we must report that progress has virtually ground to a halt. Our 
latest estimates, based on data from the years 1998-2000, put the number of undernourished people in 
the world at 840 million, of whom 799 million live in developing countries. That figure represents a 
decrease of barely 2.5 million per year over the eight years since 1990-92, the period used as the 
starting point for the drive launched at the World Food Summit.”26 Noteworthy here is not merely the 
massive 50-million rise since 1996 in the reported number of undernourished people, but also the effort 
to conceal this increase by misrepresenting the fact that the joint Declaration concluding the World 
Food Summit in Rome had very explicitly designated 1996 as the base year in terms of which the target 
of halving undernourishment was defined. 
Avoidance of the especially challenging base year of 1996 was also in evidence when the world’s 
governments convened once again in September of the year 2000, in the UN General Assembly, for 
purposes of adopting the Millennium Declaration. In its Articles 19-23, this Declaration formulates a 
number of development goals – including once more the halving of hunger – but defines these 
reductions against the baseline of “current rates,” that is, with a new base year of 2000.27 Instead of 
simply reiterating the goal announced at the 1996 World Food Summit, the Millennium Declaration 
thus formulates a new goal, albeit with the old language of halving hunger by 2015. This goal is new 
not merely by shifting the base year from 1996 to 2000. It is new also by switching from halving the 
number of hungry people to halving “the proportion of the world’s people … who suffer from hunger.”      
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 8 
Now, “proportion” means the same as “ratio” or “percentage.” So we are now monitoring the evolution 
of undernourishment as a fraction that has the number of undernourished people in the numerator and 
the world’s population in the denominator. What difference does this make? Well, one can halve a 
fraction either by halving the number in the numerator or by doubling the number in the denominator or 
by some mixed strategy. In the case before us, the denominator – the world’s population – is growing 
nicely on its own, thereby continuously shrinking the value of the fraction. So, with this new 
formulation, population growth in the denominator is doing some of the work of reducing hunger, and 
therefore less work remains to be done in the numerator. If world population grows by 20% in the 15-
year plan period, for example, to 120% of what it was in the year 2000, then the number of 
undernourished people needs to fall by only 40%, to 60% of what it was in the year 2000, to achieve the 
promised halving. Thus, by reformulating their commitment in the Millennium Declaration, 
governments substantially diluted their promise even while retaining the old language of halving 
undernourishment. 
Let me be very clear that I do not care whether governments state their hunger promise in terms of a 
number or in terms of a proportion. What I object to is the surreptitious switch, which constitutes an 
illicit shifting of the goal posts. Governments kept the headline formulation of the goal – “we will halve 
poverty and undernourishment by 2015” – but they lowered the bar so as to make this goal more easily 
achievable. 
We can illustrate the point with actual numbers. At the time the Millennium Declaration was adopted, 
the incidence of undernourishment was estimated to be around 840 million out of a world population of 
6,321 million; this is 13.29 percent. Halving this proportion by 2015 means ensuring that, by then, no 
more than 6.65 percent of humanity is undernourished. The human population will be 7.4 billion by the 
end of 2015, so the Millennium Declaration effectively promises that the number of undernourished 
people in the year 2015 will not exceed 492 million. By switching base year and by aiming to halve a 
proportion rather than a number, our governments added nearly 100 million to the number of people 
whose undernourishment in the year 2015 was to be considered acceptable.  
Soon after the UN General Assembly had officially adopted the Millennium Declaration, the UN 
leadership re-issued the promises contained therein as the Millennium Development Goals. This was 
presented and widely reported and understood to be just a reiteration of the commitments that the UN 
General Assembly had officially espoused. In fact, however, the commitments were revised yet again – 
by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and his closest advisers. They made two important changes.  
First, they confined all the goals to “the developing world,” so that the fraction to be monitored was 
now that of: number of undernourished people in the developing world divided by total number of 
people in the developing world. Undernourished people outside the developing world were simply left 
out of account, even though their number was estimated to exceed 20 million. By confining the 
numerical exercise to the less developed countries, the promised halving of undernourishment becomes 
easier once again. Because the population of the less developed countries grows faster than the 
population of the world at large, even more work is now done in the denominator and even less work 
therefore remains to be done in the numerator, where we are actually reducing the number of 
undernourished people.  
The second important change made by the UN leadership was yet another change in the base year. They 
backdated, for all the goals, the base year in which the MDG effort was to commence to the year 1990. 
This backdating of the beginning of the plan period has two important consequences. On the one hand, 
it lengthens the time period in which the population of the less developed countries is growing, thereby 
ensuring that even more work is done in the denominator. On the other hand, this backdating also 
makes it possible to count China’s successes in hunger and poverty reduction during the 1990s toward 
the fulfillment of the promises made in the year 2000. Apparently someone thought that it would be a 
shame for China’s great efforts in the 1990s to go to waste – surely these should be counted as 
contributing to the fulfillment of the commitments that the world’s governments made at the dawn of 
the new millennium.  
This brave decision to fulfill promises made in the year 2000 partly with China’s achievements of the 
1990s had some comical effects – for example, that Kofi Annan was able to announce in his very first 
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 9 
progress report that the world’s most populous region, East Asia and the Pacific, had fully achieved the 
target of halving extreme poverty already in 1999, a full year before this target had even been even 
formulated, adopted and announced.28 It is noteworthy by the way that, unlike the subsequent reports, 
this first progress report misrepresents itself as reporting on progress in regard to the Millennium 
Declaration. As the content of the report makes clear, however, it is in fact a report in regard to the 
Millennium Development Goals. This confusion seems to be an effort to make it appear as though the 
MDGs are what the UN General Assembly had adopted as part of the Millennium Declaration. This, 
however, is clearly not so. The MDGs measure progress against hunger and extreme poverty relative to 
the baseline of the year 1990 and limited to “the population of the developing regions.” The Millennium 
Declaration, by contrast, measures progress against hunger and extreme poverty relative to the baseline 
of the “current” year 2000 and includes all of humankind within its scope.29 
Let me once more illustrate the effect of these further shifts with actual figures. The official 1990 
number of chronically undernourished people in the developing countries was 843 million. This is 
19.83% of the 4,252-million population of the less developed countries in 1990. The MDG target of 
halving hunger implies then that the number of hungry people in the developing world should, in 2015, 
not exceed 9.92% of 6,045 million, that is, 600 million – and this ceiling is no longer including hungry 
people outside the developing world whose number the MDGs leave completely unconstrained.  
The successive reformulations of the promise to halve undernourishment by 2015 have thus 
dramatically diluted its meaning. In the initial World Food Summit interpretation, this promise required 
that there be no more than 395 million undernourished people worldwide in 2015. The final MDG 
version of the promise for the year 2015 permitted 600 million undernourished people just in the 
developing world while placing no limit on the number of undernourished people elsewhere. 
On top of this came the FAO’s new method, introduced in 2012, which, by raising the 1990 baseline 
number of undernourished people in the developing world by 17.5% to 990.7 million,30 correspondingly 
raised also the permissible year-2015 number of undernourished people in the developing countries by 
the same percentage to 705 million.  
Recall, finally, that when the FAO checks whether the world has achieved the 2015 target of 705 
million undernourished people in the developing world, it uses an absurdly narrow definition of 
undernourishment, counting only those people who, for over a year, ingest less energy than is needed to 
meet the minimum requirements of a sedentary lifestyle. 
In concluding this section, let me briefly show how the various goalpost shifts that our governments 
and their intergovernmental agencies have introduced have affected their measured performance with 
regard to their promise to halve undernourishment by 2015. 
Going with the World Food Summit version of the promise and the initial method for counting the 
undernourished, we find that, far from achieving a halving of undernourishment, or even any reduction, 
governments have allowed undernourishment to increase: by 7% in the 1996-2000 period, by 30% 
during 1996-2009 and by 17% during 1996-2010. 
Going with the Millennium Declaration version of the promise and the initial measurement method, we 
find that the proportion of the world’s people suffering from undernourishment remained roughly 
constant over the 2000-2010 period: the number of undernourished increased, but barely faster than the 
human population. In the year 2000, undernourishment was 840 out of 6239 million or 13.27 percent. 
In the year 2010, undernourishment was 925 million out of 6955 million or 13.30 percent.   
Going with the MDG version of the promise and the initial measurement method, we find that there has 
been some progress. In the developing world, the proportion of people suffering from 
undernourishment has fallen from 19.82% (843 out of 4252 million) in 1990 to 15.94% (910 out of 
5709 million) in 2010. This is a 19.6-percent decline in the proportion – much less embarrassing than 
the two preceding presentations, but still far off-course as far as the promised halving is concerned. 
After four-fifth of the plan period has elapsed, the proportion ought to be down by about 40 percent. 
When we combine the MDG version of the halving promise with the new measurement method, 
however, we can finally report that the fight against hunger is right on track. In the developing world, 
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the proportion of people suffering from undernourishment has fallen from 23.3% (990.7 out of 4252 
million) in 1990 to 14.1% (805 out of 5709 million) in 2010. This is exactly the 40-percent decline 
needed in order to be on track toward success in 2015. 
Unfortunately, the FAO’s new method did not deliver as impressive results after its introduction as it 
had produced in its retroactive application. The FAO is currently estimating that its final tally for the 
end of 2015 will come in at 779.9 million undernourished people in the developing countries, 
equivalent to 12.9% of their total population (FAO, IFAD & WFP 2015, 8). This would constitute a 45-
percent reduction in the proportion of undernourished people (reported as 23.3% in 1990). This will be 
considered a tolerable shortfall from the promised halving, even though it does look a bit embarrassing 
next to the fabulous overachievement that the World Bank has been reporting from the extreme-poverty 
front. 
Faced with widespread and persistent undernourishment in the world, one can do two very different 
things. One can undertake efforts toward ensuring that as many human beings as possible gain secure 
access to an adequate food supply. Or one can undertake efforts to put as positive a spin on the facts as 
one’s creativity, one’s moral principles and these facts will allow. I have here discussed solely the latter 
efforts and shown how immensely effective they have been. They have moved us from the 30% 
increase in undernourishment (from 790 million in 1996 to 1023 million in 2009) that inspired the “1 
Billion Hungry” campaign to a 40% decrease in undernourishment (from 23.3% in 1990-92 to 14.1% in 
2010-12) – without changing the situation of even one single undernourished person. 
 
4. Lessons to be Learned 
To be successful, governments and politicians in power must appear to care about the issues the citizens 
of their countries care about and must appear to be effective in addressing these issues. Citizens care 
about severe poverty and hunger, both at home and abroad. Therefore governments and politicians in 
power have an interest in expressing support for the struggle against poverty and hunger. Development 
goals, food summits, climate agreements – these are, also, political spectacles: put on as propaganda, as 
public relations. They give governments a very public way of showing that they care as much as we 
citizens do, and perhaps even more so, seeing the loftiness of their commitment to end poverty in all its 
forms once and for all. Through this concerted display, governments produce political allegiance to 
themselves – and complacency: when nearly all governments agree to something, then it’s a done deal 
and we citizens need no longer worry about it or agitate for it. And through this joint performance 
governments also divert attention away from the structural causes for the persistence of severe poverty, 
from the powerful centrifugal forces that the present organization of the global trading and financial 
systems produces. Led to celebrate the great paper advances of the SDGs and the Paris climate 
agreement, we citizens are led to overlook the very real fact that 2015 also saw the richest 1% of 
humanity expand its share of global private wealth to over half (50.4%).31 The poorer half of humanity, 
meanwhile, was squeezed down to a mere 0.6% of global private wealth, as much as is owned by the 
world’s richest 62 billionaires.32 
Governments and politicians in power must not merely appear to care. To be successful, they must also 
appear to be effective in addressing the issues their citizens care about. They therefore have an interest 
in trying to support the appearance that they are effective contributors to the fight against hunger and 
poverty. This appearance is most easily maintained when the struggle can be made to appear successful. 
Such an appearance of success can be achieved through real success: though substantial reductions in 
severe poverty and hunger. But it can also be achieved, and at much lower cost, through creative 
accounting and clever exposition. As the saying, popularized by Mark Twain, has it: there are lies, 
damn lies and then there are statistics.33 
Statistics can be used to mislead without lying, and they have the further advantage of being 
complicated. The limited debunking exercise I have performed above is, admittedly, not beyond the 
reach of a dedicated college student, but it does go well beyond what ordinary citizens of affluent 
countries are suspicious and committed enough to wade through – especially when they know how hard 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 11 
it would be to get a hearing for the results of their work among their compatriots. This is decidedly not 
a story that mainstream media would care and dare to pick up. 
Intergovernmental agencies such as the UN and its sub-organizations, including the FAO and the World 
Bank, are politically vulnerable and exposed. Governments appoint and then re-appoint or replace their 
top officials. Governments finance their budgets – partly through regular assessed contributions and 
partly through ad hoc payments in support of particular programs and initiatives.34 And governments 
also influence the success or failure of those agencies in countless other ways. Officials in these 
intergovernmental agencies therefore have a personal and professional interest in being on good terms 
with national governments and politicians in power, especially with those of the most powerful states.  
To surmise that this interest has an impact, one does not need to postulate some nefarious conspiracy 
where some U.S. State Department official phones the FAO’s Director-General to demand a better-
looking hunger trend. Nor does one need to postulate corruption or immorality within the FAO. The 
effect can come about in a benign way also, like this. FAO officials understand how much their 
genuinely important work depends on the willing support of the more powerful governments. They also 
understand that it matters to these governments that their neo-liberal globalization project should be 
perceived as equitable and successful. Therefore, in order not to endanger the FAO’s good work, they 
take care not to antagonize powerful governments; and, if they find that they have given offence (as the 
FAO found in the wake of its “1 Billion Hungry” campaign), then they try to make amends. 
The first lesson is straightforward. If we want to have accurate information about the extent, trend and 
distribution of deprivations such as undernourishment, then we must not entrust the task of gathering, 
processing and presenting this information to such politically exposed and vulnerable 
intergovernmental agencies. Let these agencies lead the effort to eradicate hunger and severe poverty, 
but let us not also put them in charge of assessing this effort. This assessment function can be far more 
reliably performed by an independent network of reputable academic experts, proceeding with vigorous 
peer review in an objective and transparent manner. 
Academics can really make a meaningful contribution to the fight against poverty by participating in 
this sort of assessment effort that draws on their special training and academic virtues. We should 
convene the best academic thinkers on poverty from the relevant disciplines and from a broad range of 
countries, and should ask them to agree, step-by-step, in an open and transparent process, on a 
definition of poverty, undernourishment, etc., and on plausible and feasible measurement procedures. 
Once agreed upon, no such measurement method should be revised for any reason during the 
measurement period. It can of course be criticized and be revised on the basis of such criticism; but the 
implementation of any such revision should wait until the next measurement period so as to make 
evident that there are no ulterior motives in play. We have superb academics who have excellent 
reputations to lose and who would do a great job in constructing, together, a solid measurement method 
in a transparent and politically independent way – converging, one would hope, upon something more 
nuanced than the FAO’s simple binary classification: tracking undernourishment at the population level 
must be sensitive at least to the severity of the nutritional deficit, which depends on its nature, 
magnitude and duration.   
The proposed academic network should also be entrusted with organizing and supervising the 
associated data collection to ensure that it follows the agreed-upon method as closely as feasible. Once 
all this is in place, the world will be able, for the first time, to have confidence in the official reports 
about the extent, trend and geographical and demographic distribution of undernourishment. 
Governments will not easily give up monopoly control over the official development data, especially 
after they have, by proclaiming a plethora of development goals, conferred some political prominence 
upon these data. So I do not expect that governments would be prepared to transfer the relevant 
assessment funding from their own intergovernmental agencies to an objective and independent 
academic network. It is entirely possible, however, that we academics build an international and 
interdisciplinary research network that systematically produces an alternative dataset – a comprehensive 
second opinion, if you like – on the nature, prevalence, severity, trends and distribution of deprivations 
worldwide.35 This is something that, with the help of ordinary research funding, we can organize 
ourselves to do well, and it is something that we absolutely owe to the world’s poor. 
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The proposed network would still have to contend with governments that are determined to control the 
data about their own country. Currently, when such a government is powerful enough, it can insist that 
its own data be accepted by the relevant intergovernmental agency or can at least demand to 
“collaborate” in and thereby influence the collection and processing of its national data. (Not all 
national statistical offices are wholly objective and free from political influence.) The proposed network 
may be able to do better by rigorously documenting any constraints on or interference with its work – 
something that intergovernmental agencies are rarely in a position to do. Such a practice of 
documentation would work as a deterrent against interference and would also give data users a sense of 
the varying quality and likely bias of the component data. 
Proceeding now to the second lesson. We should expect, and be vigilant against, government 
commitments that look much more ambitious than they really are. Examples of this are commitments 
that governments can deflate after the fact by revising, with the benefit of hindsight, their meaning and 
measurement, as they have done with their commitments to halve poverty and undernourishment by 
2015.  
But the problem goes deeper than this insofar as the entire practice of historical benchmarking easily 
makes it appear as though all progress is governmental achievement – even while much of the 
improvement in the conditions of the world’s poor is simply the effect of ordinary economic growth. 
Real global per capita income is said to have grown at 2 to 2.5 percent annually in recent decades, 
amounting to an increase of roughly 70% over any 25-year period.36 In fact, this was roughly the 
increase in real global per capita income during the 1990-2015 MDG period. With such a quarter 
century of growth, it is to be expected, then, that incomes in the poorer percentiles of humanity will end 
up about 70% higher. And this will naturally raise many of these poorer percentiles above any 
stationary extreme poverty line and to an income level that suffices for secure access to adequate 
nutrition. To say that our governments’ MDG exercise has “lifted” all these people out of poverty is 
pure nonsense. In fact, on the contrary, even more people would have escaped extreme poverty if our 
governments had ensured a more equitable distribution of the global economic growth of the last 25 
years rather than channeling a disproportionately large share of it to the top percentiles of the global 
income and wealth hierarchy. 
We have seen that, by assessing their performance diachronically (by comparison against a historical 
benchmark), our governments are massively biasing this assessment toward success. Effortless progress 
is all but assured if we compare the condition of the poor with their condition in the much poorer world 
economy of 15 or 25 years ago. (It is all the more distressing, then, that, according to the FAO’s old 
method, the number of undernourished rose by 21% in the 1996-2009 period, from 843 to 1023 
million.) 
Such diachronic assessments also involve an even deeper and more pernicious distortion. They suggest, 
falsely, that present deprivations are somehow rendered morally more acceptable by the fact that like 
deprivations were even more widespread and severe in the past. To appreciate this monumental moral 
error, consider the example of slavery in the U.S. ante-bellum South. Imagine a defender of slavery in 
1845 describing all the ways in which slavery had become less cruel during the preceding 20 years: 
slaves were not worked as hard as had been customary in 1820, floggings and rapes of slaves had 
become less brutal and less frequent, and it had also become less common for slave families to be split 
apart through sales to different buyers. Would all this progress justify or excuse, in any way, the 
continuation of the practice of slavery? Evidently, it would not. The fact that slavery had been even 
worse in earlier times is morally irrelevant. The morally relevant comparison is not with what had been 
actual 25 years earlier, but with what was possible right then, in 1845. If it was possible to abolish 
slavery in 1845, then slavery ought to have been abolished then. 
We should make the analogous response to the persistence of widespread undernourishment and other 
poverty-related deprivations: they are avoidable, their continuation is a grave injustice, and they ought 
to be eradicated from our world as quickly and thoroughly as is humanly possible. The fact that hunger 
and poverty were even worse in earlier years should not be allowed to detract from this moral 
imperative. In both cases, the morally relevant comparison is not the diachronic one with an earlier state 
of the world, but the synchronic one with what is presently possible. The abolition of slavery was 
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possible in 1845, and so it should have been abolished then. The eradication of severe poverty 
worldwide is possible today, so we must eradicate it as fast as we possibly can. 
Once we have the synchronic comparison firmly in view, we can apply a different kind of historical 
comparison. We can ask how much of the severe poverty and undernourishment extant in different 
periods of human history was avoidable at those times. Unlike the historical comparison that the MDGs 
and SDGs seek to encourage, this historical comparison comes out firmly against our present 
generation. Never in human history has severe poverty been as easily and as completely eradicable as in 
the present period. That we continue to perpetuate it through national and supranational institutional 
arrangements massively skewed in favor of the rich manifests a great moral failing of our generation, of 
governments and citizens alike. 
Let me relate the second lesson to the contrast between goals and rights. The language of goals invites a 
diachronic, incremental approach: we have a certain distance to traverse, and so we set off in the 
direction of our destination and approach it step-by-step. This image is wholly out of place when rights 
are at issue. When we recognize a human right not to be enslaved, then we must not make a 25-year 
plan aiming to halve the number of slaves or aiming to make slavery half as cruel. When we recognize 
a human right not to be exterminated, then we must not make a 25-year plan to reduce the Nazi killing 
rate to half its present level. When we recognize a human right not to be subjected to economic 
institutions under which many people foreseeably and avoidably cannot meet their basic needs, then we 
must not make a 25-year plan to halve these deprivations but must at once initiate the necessary 
institutional reforms. Our governments have, of course, recognized such a human right many times, 
most prominently perhaps in their International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights – 
adopted in 1966 and legally binding since 1976 – which postulates “the fundamental right of everyone 
to be free from hunger” (Article 11(2)). 
Conversely, if we do regard the eradication of severe poverty and undernourishment as a goal to be 
slowly approached over many decades, thereby accepting hundreds of millions of poverty-related 
deaths in the interim, then we are in effect denying that there is a human right to life, a human right to 
an adequate standard of living. 
In a way, our response has been even worse than that. The concept of a goal implies some definite agent 
whose goal it is. And it implies that this agent has a reasonably clear idea about the steps she will take 
to achieve the goal and also has both the commitment and the means necessary to take these steps. 
Many people before John F. Kennedy had expressed the desire that human beings should visit the 
moon. But for them such a visit was not a goal because they either had no idea how to get there or else 
lacked the necessary means for organizing such a journey. Even if such people declared a human visit 
to the moon to be their goal, it would be more accurately described as their wish. Kennedy, however, 
transformed this wish into a goal. He had a plan, and he was willing and able to mobilize the means this 
plan called for. 
Given this distinction between goals and wishes, I think it would be more appropriate to speak of the 
Millennium Development Wishes. Governments publicly agreed that it would be a good thing if a 
certain set of propositions were to come true by 2015. Let hunger be half as widespread as it was in 
1990 (and let there be love and peace as well!). But they did not agree on a division of labor and of 
responsibilities toward making these propositions true. The agreement left entirely unspecified who was 
to do what. So, when we fell behind, badly, on undernourishment and other fronts, there was no 
authoritative way of identifying the party or parties required to make additional efforts to get us back on 
target. This complete exclusion of specific responsibilities from the agreement made it easy for 
governments to sign on, because they were committing themselves to nothing in particular: should 
some of the agreed wishes remain unfulfilled, each government would always be able to explain this by 
lamenting others’ insufficient exertions. And so it actually happened when progress stalled: 
governments looked encouragingly at one another with the sharable prompt that “something ought to be 
done.”37 
Now in this game of blame shifting, the developed West has the advantage of possessing the loudest 
and savviest media, and it used this advantage to propagate the notion that each country should be in 
charge of achieving the MDGs within its own territory. We are, to use another example, to reduce by 
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two thirds the global rate of children dying before the age of 5; so each country should reduce its under-
5 mortality rate by two thirds. If the world is underperforming, then the governments of the 
underperforming countries are to blame.  
But this division of labor is evidently hugely unfair, because it saddles the poorest, least capable 
countries with the largest responsibilities: the poorer and hence less capable a country is, the larger is its 
task. Extremely poor countries with very high birth rates, such as Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, East 
Timor, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Uganda and Zambia were supposed to get their under-5 mortality rates down from around 200 (per 
1000 children born) to 70 or so, while rich countries like Japan and the U.S. needed only reduce their 
rates from 6 to 2 or from 11 to 4, respectively.38 So the poorest, least capable countries were assigned 
disproportionately large shares of the global task and the richest countries disproportionately small 
shares. This is an extremely unfair division of labor, made even more unbalanced by the fact that the 
“developed regions” were even excluded from some of the MDGs (as we have seen in the cases of the 
undernourishment and extreme-poverty targets). But, given that the MDGs specified no division of 
labor, it was easy for Western officials and media to propagate this lopsided allocation of 
responsibilities. 
<BLANK LINE HERE> 
For many decades now humanity has had the capacity to eradicate undernourishment and other poverty-
related deprivations. Yet poverty-related causes still account for about a third of all human deaths, and 
severe deprivations are still blighting the lives of Humanity’s poorest third, whose share of global 
household income has been reduced to barely 2 percent. In human terms, this is a disaster of 
unimaginable magnitude. In economic terms, it is a minor challenge – comparable to the invasion of 
Iraq.  
Our response to the disastrous conditions that so many of our contemporaries are subjected to has been 
morally absurd: we agree that severe poverty and undernourishment should gradually shrink, hope that 
this will happen through economic growth with trickle-down and resort to creative accounting when 
increasing global inequality impedes the hoped-for progress. 
To banish severe poverty and hunger from this planet, we need to recognize them as massive human 
rights violations that we must stop at once. We must implement institutional reforms at the national and 
especially the supranational level to achieve a more equitable distribution of global household income, 
which would ensure that even the poorest can meet their basic needs.  
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contributions cannot be counted upon: the U.S. has withdrawn twice (1984 and 2011) from UNESCO in protest, 
for example, thereby cutting that agency’s budget by about one quarter.    
35 The Seattle-based Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation constitutes a partial model of how such a network 
might function.  
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visited December 25, 2015). 
 
37 The recent Paris climate accord is a perfect example of this strategy of announcing ambitious wishes. Our 
governments agreed on a stellar proposition: that human greenhouse gas emissions would not raise the global 
average surface temperature more than 1.5 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial level (we are now at +1.0 
degree). In addition, each government pledged its own Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. If all 
governments fully live up to their pledges, the global average surface temperature will rise to exceed the pre-
industrial level by more than 2 degree Celsius. Despite this obvious disconnect between their agreed wish and 
their individual pledges, our governments did manage to inspire widespread celebrations and complacency: phew, 
this problem is solved!   
38 National under-5 mortality rates for 1990 can be found at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT?page=5 (last visited December 25, 2015).  
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